There has been much confusion as to why the US persists to wage its war in Afghanistan when its target is al-Qaeda, a hugely diminished presence in Afghanistan, and not the Taliban, an ethnic group of domestic insurgents merely fighting for their cause in their local turf. US President Barack Obama, however, calls the war in Afghanistan a “war of necessity” as the ‘US military campaign against Taliban forces in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing al-Qaeda form reestablishing a base that could be used to plot attacks against Americans.’
Here are some expert opinion regarding the supposed relationship between the Arab terrorist group al-Qaeda and the Afghan insurgent group Taliban in the light of the move to increase US military presence in Afghanistan.
Richard Barrett, Coordinator, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, says, “The Afghan Taliban is a nationalist movement, and they repeatedly say they’re a nationalist movement. When they look at what they’ve gained from their association with al-Qaeda, [it's] pretty much heavy on the negative side rather than on the positive side. They got kicked out in October 2001. Maybe if al-Qaeda hadn’t attacked the United States in September 2001, they’d still be in Kabul, they’d be the recognized government.”
Sajjan M. Gohel, Director for International Security, Asia-Pacific Foundation, says, “The Taliban have this Pashtunwali code about housing a guest. Al-Qaeda was deemed as a guest in Afghanistan; it was an important dynamic in the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Where there have been problems, an issue that could perhaps be exploited further, is that the Afghan Taliban resented people like Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Egyptian brigade. Al-Zawahiri was very overbearing in the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and it created problems in the relationship. But nevertheless, the Taliban remained loyal to al-Qaeda. There is an ideological connection: al-Qaeda adopts a very strict interpretation of the Quran that is Wahabi/Salafi-esque; the Taliban is Deobandi. The relationship is close ideologically, and it is that relationship that binds them together.”
Ronald E. Neumann, President, American Academy of Diplomacy; former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, says, “This idea that if the Taliban comes back, al-Qaeda either doesn’t come with them–or is controllable or isn’t a threat–is a very speculative theoretical foundation. This seems to me a very speculative basis, which has no real solid evidence to support it, on which to take a very large national security risk. And if you have a Taliban return with al-Qaeda, you then have effectively the strategic rear of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Just as you say you can’t deal with Afghanistan without dealing with Pakistan, so it is absolutely impossible to say that you are going to deal with extremism in Pakistan while you lose the fight in Afghanistan.”
Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies; former Director for Operations and Intelligence, British Secret Intelligence Service, says, “Operationally, there is some evidence of al-Qaeda working with the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda itself doesn’t do real operations in Afghanistan–it’s not in the position to do so–the most it can hope to be is a kind of force multiplier for the other entities that are already there. In that context it has been ready to provide some support and assistance to Afghan Taliban units–weapons training, some material assistance. Also, some of the foreign fighters are experienced fighters and know quite a lot about military tactics. So there has been, at the tactical level, a certain of amount of cooperation.”
Via Council on Foreign Relations
