The Kyoto Protocol is an obvious failure in its mandate to enjoin countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, and quite ironically, ‘global carbon-dioxide emissions have grown by 25% since the protocol was adopted in 1997.’

There are glaring reasons why the soon-to-expire Kyoto Protocol did not succeed. This treaty left out of the roster of considerations such a huge problem as deforestation. Also, ‘potential participants were put off by the idea of internationally binding commitments.’

The Copenhagen climate deal that is supposed to be signed by countries in December 2009 is touted to be a more effective replacement or follow up to the failed Kyoto Protocol. After all, it has the benefit of hindsight.

Some are starting to suspect that the much awaited climate deals in Copenhagen will not be closed. The aims of the summit deal in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions targeted at specific years will come at huge economic costs to economies that are still dependent on fossil fuels. A crash is, in fact, anticipated at Copenhagen. The participants just might not buy into the details, thereby creating an incohesive deal. For starters, developing countries already fear that ‘internationally binding commitments could be used as justifications for imposing tariffs on them.’

Some have forwarded diplomatic strategies to avoid the impending crash through ways and means in getting the climate negotiations on the right track for the desired successful deal. The trick, some say, is ‘moving the negotiations onto a different diplomatic track.’

Salient suggestions have come from Australia. ‘All countries would come up with a “national schedule” of programmes, such as cap-and-trade and low-carbon regulations. Developed countries would also specify an amount by which they mean to reduce their emissions. These commitments would have the force of domestic law, but would not be subject to international sanctions. And measures that have the force of domestic law are more likely to stick than those signed up to in a treaty under diplomatic pressure.’

Via Economist.com